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THE SUNSET SONG OF RELIGION,
OR, HAVE WE EVER BEEN POST-SECULAR?
Matthew Wickman

Crawford Gribben makes an important point in his article, “The Literary
Cultures of the Scottish Reformation,” namely that the outsized influence
of Hugh MacDiarmid and Edwin Muir, each of whom famously disparages
the legacy of John Knox and tries to connect modern Scottish writing to a
pre-Reformation tradition, causes us to overlook the literary qualities of
Scottish Reformed writing. In the process, Gribben introduces readers to
important names associated with (or opposed to) that movement—figures
like Robert Lindsay, James Kirkwood, Ninian Winzet, Robert Baillie, and
many others. As a secondary point, Gribben’s piece also attests to the
power of compelling criticism, its capacity to shape cultural narratives—
for, in addition to their other gifts, MacDiarmid and Muir were certainly
compelling critics. Hence, Gribben’s critical engagement of the past
necessarily compensates for the success of its own enterprise: criticism.
But more provocative to me than the persuasive point(s) Gribben makes
are some questions that he provoked as I reflected on his intervention: Does
the legacy of MacDiarmid and Muir primarily encourage us to overlook a
period of history, the Reformation? Or is it, rather, an entire mode of
experience—religious experience, particularly lived religion—that they
incline us to dismiss? The latter would seem to be a more encompassing
lacuna than our inattention to history, for scholars are usually trained to
redress the latter. Gribben himself does so in attending to key writers and
stylistic features of Scotland’s sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Indeed,
we are hyper-accustomed in our present (historicist) era to retrieve
historical information; as Gribben himself acknowledges, the work of
scholars like Patrick Collinson, R. D. S. Jack, David Allan, and others
means that no historian of the Reformation period labors alone. However,
historical information is not quite the same thing as historical
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understanding, for the latter results from a hermeneutical exercise that
requires a degree of identification with the past, a perceived basis of
commonality: a shared cultural gene through which we perceive key
differences in our cultural inheritance. When we lose our ability to relate
to the past—including at the level of religious feeling, not simply religious
ideas—we lose our history.
But do we ever truly lose religious feeling? If we lend credence to the
Durkheimian thesis that our very capacity for conceptual abstraction is
rooted in our religious impulses, or if we discern with more recent
anthropologists like Talal Asad that western secularism is itself deeply
inscribed by its religious genealogy (in areas from politics and poetry to
medicine), then no, we remain a deeply religious species.1 As Durkheim in
particular has it, we might sometimes be religious despite ourselves, for
religion is, primordially speaking, less a creed than a cognitive reflex, a
way of making meaning, any meaning. This is especially true of things we
deem sacred, ultimate, “special.”2 Only at one remove does religion begin
to divide and subdivide into formal systems (Jewish, Christian, Moslem,
Buddhist, Hindu; Catholic versus Protestant, Lutheran versus Calvinist,
New Light versus Auld Licht, and so on). In failing to identify these
general, pre-creedal reflexes toward ultimacy as religious, we
misrecognize ourselves, which means we confound the past even when we
open all archives, release all ghosts.
More problematic, then, than the MacDiarmid-Muir thesis obscuring
an extended moment of the religious past would be the inference that
religion itself were somehow of negligible significance in how we read and
understand Scottish literature. Neither Muir nor MacDiarmid asserts as
much, but one wonders—and Gribben’s essay gestures evocatively in this
direction—whether the imaginative strength of the Muir-MacDiarmid
thesis does not inspire something of this view. Then again, perhaps their
disparagement of Knox’s legacy produces a different kind of critical
reaction. Yes, it seems fair to say that many critics are less attuned to
1

See Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, translated by
Karen E. Fields (New York: Free Press, 1995), esp. 418-448, and Talal Asad,
Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2003).
2 For the religious scholar Ann Taves, the term “special” denotes what is sacred,
magical, mystical, or spiritual; see her Religious Experience Reconsidered: A
Building-Block Approach to the Study of Religion and Other Special Things
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), esp. 26-28.
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religion than they might be. But might this extend even to those who
dedicate themselves to documenting the religious past? Consider how
MacDiarmid and Muir identify a cultural wellspring in the ancient Scottish
world, attribute lapsarian qualities to the Reformation, and vividly
denounce the emptiness of Scotland’s literary inheritance; in Muir’s
memorable words: Walter Scott “spent most of his days in a hiatus, in a
country … [that] had, instead of a centre, a blank, an Edinburgh, in the
middle of it.”3 Might this not inspire almost the opposite tendency in
critics? That is, precisely because Muir and MacDiarmid disparage the
religious past, might Scottish critics alert to religion become almost too
literal in their rebuttals, citing chapter and verse in showing where Muir
and MacDiarmid got it wrong? Without disregarding the importance of
such—historical—specificity, what happens here to religious experience:
encounters with the sacred, the ultimate, and the special? How do they
communicate themselves in criticism? Might we misread either when we
dismiss religion or when we too quickly attach it to creed and creed to
history? In a way, isn’t this what MacDiarmid and Muir condemned in the
first place – forms of worshipful attention that accommodate the hyperspecificity of dogma, and that curtail our sense of religious possibility as a
result?
I do not wish to downplay the importance of good historical
scholarship. But to get at the problem Muir and MacDiarmid represent
today in Scottish literary criticism, it may take more than enumerating the
literary qualities (and acolytes) of the Scottish Reformation. Gribben’s
article is, to be sure, an important step. But a more searching analysis of
the problems his article raises may require us to engage a little more
liberally the enduring feeling for religion in Scottish writing. In other
words, we need to inquire not only into the material aspects of the Scottish
religious past, but also into the elusive presence of something like a
postsecular impulse in Scottish literature.
By invoking the postsecular, I direct us down a particular avenue of the
so-called “religious turn” in criticism over the past couple of decades. The
broader religious turn emerged with the renewed interest in theology by
French phenomenologists during the 1970s and ’80s. Key figures here
included Paul Ricoeur, Jean-Luc Marion, Michel Henry, Jean-Louis
Chrétien, Jean-Luc Nancy, Jacques Derrida, and others. Much of this work
was predicated on a careful rereading of the German phenomenological
3

Muir, Scott and Scotland: The Predicament of the Scottish Writer (New York:
Robert Speller, 1938), 11-12.
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tradition rooted in the philosophy of Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger.
Asking pointed questions about what it means to perceive objects, interpret
scripture, pray, and experience the sacred, the theological turn finds
meaningful inheritors today in, for example, the “anatheism” (or
exploration of dynamic religious origins) of Richard Kearney and
thoughtful reflection on the spiritual senses by Kevin Hart.4
The postsecular is something a little different. At least in the United
States, the term mostly came to the fore after September 11, 2001, and
designates less a specified body of work than a general affect, a structure
of feeling.5 The seminal text here is Charles Taylor’s massive historical
tome (to some eyes, the loose, baggy monster), A Secular Age. Taylor takes
aim at the long-dominant secularization thesis, the presumption that during
the nineteenth century, especially, traditional beliefs in God evaporated
under the hot sun of evolutionary science and Marxian critique. This is not
only overly simplistic, Taylor argues, it is manifestly untrue. What we find,
rather, is “a move from a society where belief in God is unchallenged …
to one in which it is understood to be one option among others, and
frequently not the easiest to embrace.”6 Today, no belief goes
“unchallenged,” whether theistic, atheistic, or agnostic; or, as Taylor says
elsewhere, in “a pluralist world … many forms of belief and unbelief jostle,
and hence fragilize each other” (Taylor, 531). No viewpoint seems secure,
which means many seem possible.
Building on this sense of possibility, Lori Branch argues that the
postsecular is about a particular kind of openness, whether to the radical
otherness of God, the proximal otherness of strangers, the obligations and
affordances of communities, or simply the willingness to entertain big
questions. These are the kinds of question, she asserts, to which historicism
alone is inadequate:
4

While Kearney and Hart have since published lengthier meditations on these
issues, shorter versions of them may be found in Material Spirit: Religion and
Literature Intranscendent, eds. Gregory C. Stallings, Manuel Asensi, and Carl
Good (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014). Kearney’s chapter is titled
“Eucharistic Imaginings in Proust and Woolf” (pp. 11-34) and Hart’s “‘For the Life
Was Manifested’” (pp. 73-93).
5 The term gained wider critical currency from Jurgen Habermas’s 2007 lecture
“Notes on Post-Secular Society,” English translation in New Perspectives
Quarterly, 25.4 (Fall 2008): 17-29. On postsecularity as a structure of feeling, see
Mark Eaton’s forthcoming book, Religion and American Literature since 1950
(New York: Bloomsbury, 2020).
6 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2007), 3.
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Global politics since 9/11 have for some only intensified
strategies for avoiding questions that seem “big” or religious
—where do I come from? what happens to me when I die?
what does it mean to live well or beautifully? what is love?
—as though entertaining the questions texts pose as
anything other than objects of historical inquiry would be
either to return us to the (naïve or bad-faith) orthodoxies of
the New Critics, or to make us violent fundamentalists. 7
To pose these questions seriously—to recognize that historicism alone
provides a paucity of explanations for what it means to exist, to be, to
mean—is to draw on the traditions that have asked such questions most
thoughtfully. And this means returning to religion—better said, to
something like religious feeling—and exploring what such affects as faith
and hope, reverence and awe might mean in a world that increasingly
merges religion and secularity, and in which pluralism describes the
complexity of competing belief systems within individuals, the fragile
status of their own life credos.
All this has me thinking again about Sunset Song, the first novel in
Lewis Grassic Gibbon’s classic trilogy, A Scots Quair. Gibbon was a
contemporary of MacDiarmid’s and Muir’s and, like them, he was none
too enthusiastic about the legacy of the Scottish Reformation. Sunset Song
lends expression to that distaste in various ways, among them the presence
of a lecherous minister and the brutishness of a supposedly God-fearing
father who drives his wife to suicide, entertains incestuous thoughts toward
his daughter, and nearly beats his son to death over the son’s jocular taking
of the Lord’s name in vain. For Alan MacGillivray and Douglas Gifford,
Gibbon’s novel reveals how “the dark strand of Scottish religion, in the
form of Calvinist Presbyterianism, although a declining force, [is] still …
[an] inhibiting element in community life.”8 Scott Lyall adds that “Sunset
Song—notwithstanding the admiration shown in the novel for the
Presbyterian Covenanters—is about the largely malign influence of
religion, specifically Calvinism, upon the community of Kinraddie, which
the Reverend Gibbon” in the novel, a kind of stick-figure stand-in for the
Lori Branch, “Postsecular Studies,” The Routledge Companion to Literature and
Religion, ed. Mark Knight (London: Routledge, 2016), 99.
8 Alan MacGillivray and Douglas Gifford [and Simon Hall], “Lewis Grassic
Gibbon [and Eric Linklater],” in Scottish Literature, eds. Douglas Gifford, Sarah
Dunnigan, and Alan MacGillivray (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002),
587.
7
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author, “calls ‘a rotten kailyard.’”9
These observations generally capture the tenor of criticism regarding
Gibbon’s religious views. To cite some additional examples, Marshall
Walker remarks that Gibbon’s “trilogy moves from legend to history,”
tracing the standard course of secularization.10 Philippe Laplace reads the
status of religion in Gibbon’s novel by way of Antonio Gramsci’s theory
of “contradictory consciousness,” in which a rebellious spirit (evident in
the spoken and tacit complaints of the people of Kinraddie) ultimately
settles into an acceptance of its own subjection (with religious sermons as
one means to that end).11 Margery Palmer McCulloch reiterates the
received wisdom that Chris’s father personifies “Old Testament religion”
but then adds, with greater subtlety, that Gibbon, like Marx, believed that
while “history was deterministic, carrying human beings along with it,”
people nevertheless have “the power to shape if not to alter that historical
process.”12
As evidence of Gibbon’s views on that subject, McCulloch invokes
Gibbon’s essay “Religion,” an outwardly antagonistic characterization of
formal creeds that has set the tone for much of the criticism of religion in
Gibbon’s work. Gibbon was trained as a journalist, and “Religion”
frequently has a punchy, sententious quality that lacks the emotional
nuance of Sunset Song. In fact, Gibbon’s essay may be responsible for
overdetermining the perception of religion in his novel. Appearing in
Scottish Scene, the 1934 book of essays Gibbon published with
MacDiarmid, “Religion” is a rhetorical and affective cousin to the
criticisms of MacDiarmid and Muir: “Release from the secular power of
the Kirk … had effects on the Scots similar to those that sunlight and wine
Scott Lyall, “‘Tenshillingland’: Community and Commerce, Myth and Madness
in the Modern Scottish Novel,” Community in Modern Scottish Literature, ed. Scott
Lyall (Leiden: SCROLL/Brill/Rodopi, 2016), 10.
10 Marshall Walker, Scottish Literature Since 1707 (London: Longman, 1996), 235.
For a recent discussion of Gibbon and secularization, see Ian Campbell, “‘A Thin
and Tattered Veil’: Lewis Grassic Gibbon and the Church of Scotland,” SSL, 43.1
(2017): 115-123: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/ssl/vol43/iss1/11/.
11 Philippe Laplace, “Freedom and Subservience in Lewis Grassic Gibbon’s Sunset
Song,” Taking Liberties: Scottish Literature and Expressions of Freedom, ed. by
Ian Brown, David Clark and Rubén Jarazo-Álvarez (Glasgow: Association for
Scottish Literary Studies, 2016), 146-47.
12 Margery Palmer McCulloch, Scottish Modernism and its Contexts, 1918-1959:
Literature, National Identity and Cultural Exchange (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2009), 136.
9
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might have on a prisoner emerging from long years in a dank cellar.” 13
However, also like MacDiarmid and Muir, Gibbon is reaching for
something other than mere Kirk-critique. From whence religion—the very
impulse? It does not derive from altruism, awe, “the exercise of a superconscious sense,” ethics, or morality. “Instead, a Religion is no more than
a corpus of archaic science” with utilitarian motives: “Religion for the Scot
was essentially a means of assuring himself life in the next world, health
in this, prosperity, wealth, fruitful wombs and harvests” (313-14). In the
primitive world that Gibbon romanticized, and perhaps fetishized, in the
form of Diffusionism (a theory of peaceful human habitation prior to
civilization—and taken to an extreme that would have made Rousseau
proud), there was not—not yet—religion: “Man is naturally irreligious.
Religion is no more fundamental to the human character than cancer is
fundamental to the human brain” (313). Religion is, rather, a product of
history, which is precisely what makes it dangerous: “The present writer
had no hand in bringing about the decay of Religion; nor, alas, is he likely
to have any hand in planning its succession. That succession lies with great
economic and historical movements now in being,” and was taking its most
dour form, in the historical moment of the 1930s, in the looming specter of
Fascism: “What has happened in Italy and Germany may happen in
Scotland. The various Scots nationalist parties have large elements of
Fascism within them” (325). Hence, Gibbon professed to be against
religion altogether:
Of the future of Religion ultimately the historian can have little
doubt: he sees its coming in ancient times, in the world of the
Simple Men, as a cortical abortion, a misapprehension of the
functions and activities of nature…. He sees its passing from the
human scene—even the Scots scene—in the processes of change,
immutable and unsayable (325).

Religion as a “dank cellar,” a “cancer,” a “cortical abortion”; Fascism
as religion in its modern form: such expressions, though vivid, leave little
room for ambiguity. As Lyall insightfully remarks, however, the picture is
more complicated:
The critique of Calvinism in Sunset Song clears the way for new
forms of religion and new ideas of community in the following two
novels of the Scots Quair trilogy: the Reverend Colquohoun’s
Gibbon, “Religion,” in Gibbon and MacDiarmid, Scottish Scene; or, The
Intelligent Man’s Guide to Albyn (London: Jarrolds, 1934), 323. Subsequent
references will be cited in the text.
13
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humane but ineffectual Christian socialism in Cloud Howe (1933)
and Ewan’s anti-humanist revolutionary communism in Grey
Granite (1934).14

And not only that: Sunset Song frequently appeals to a quality of place and
experience irreducible to the boundaries of history. Hence, where Gibbon’s
essay criticizes formalized religion, his novel reaches for something purer,
holier, more sacred—and, on that very basis, religious.
Indeed, Sunset Song exhibits keen and sometimes poignant religious
sensibilities in its attentiveness to the sacred. It gives expression to these
sensibilities through, for example, the attitudes of its narrator toward
members of the community, of Chris Guthrie to matters of ultimate value,
and of the characters and narrator toward the vitality of the land and the
residual presence of those who once graced it, labored on it, and lived and
died on it. This seems evident in one of the novel’s most oft-cited passages,
an important turning point when Chris reflects on “Greek words of
forgotten lessons … Nothing endures.”
And then a queer thought came to her there in the drookèd fields,
that nothing endured at all, nothing but the land she passed across,
tossed and turned and perpetually changed below the hands of the
crofter folk since the oldest of them had set the Standing Stones by
the loch of Blawearie and climbed there on their holy days and saw
their terraced crops ride brave in the wind and sun. Sea and sky and
folk who wrote and fought and were learned, teaching and saying
and praying, they lasted but as a breath, a mist of fog in the hills,
but the land was forever, it moved and changed below you, but was
forever, you were close to it and it to you, not at a bleak remove it
held you and hurted you.15

What seems important about this passage is not only its train of association
—from the wisdom of the pre-Socratics and the durability of the land to
the virtual ghosts of the people who once dwelled on it and their life habits
(“teaching and saying and praying”)—but also the conjunctive rhythm of
the language: “tossed and turned and perpetually changed … climbed there
on their holy days and saw their terraced crops … Sea and sky and folk
who wrote and fought and were learned,” and so on. The rhetorical cadence
and string of associations act almost as a kind of genius loci, a spirit neither
pagan nor creedal but very much present, lighting on figure after figure
across the horizon: “you were close to it and it to you, not at a bleak remove
Lyall, “‘Tenshillingland,’” 11.
Gibbon, Sunset Song, ed. by William K. Malcolm (London: Penguin 2007), 126.
Subsequent references will be cited in the text.
14
15
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it held you….”
The writing is not recognizably sectarian, but it is evocatively religious.
Better said, it is spiritual, replete with a sense of the land as what transcends
and yet lends value to individual human lives, as what forges connections
across time and communities. This is what Chae Strachan, Kinraddie’s
sentimental socialist, tries to communicate to his local rival (and beloved
friend) Long Rob of the Mill, an atheist who later becomes a martyr of war:
“Something there IS up there, Rob man, there’s no denying that. If I thought
there wasn’t I’d out and cut my throat this minute” (107, italics in original).
The suicidal threat is the human touch of maudlin absurdity set against the
experience of “Something” to which the narrative itself persistently attests,
as when Chris indignantly refutes the anti-nationalist invective her brother
Will hurtles at her—and that Gibbon himself was known to formulate:
Chris felt a sudden burst of anger through her heart … and then she
looked round Kinraddie in the evening light, seeing it so quiet and
secure and still, thinking of the seeds that pushed up their shoots
from a thousand earthy mouths. Daft of Will to say that: Scotland
lived, she could never die, the land would outlast them all.…
(220).16

Scotland as nation is different, here, from Scotland as land: toward the
former, Chris often expresses frustration; toward the latter, her feelings
frequently border on awe. Or again, at her father’s funeral, a prospect she
had previously welcomed, Chris suddenly finds herself taken with a sense
of cosmic connectedness to her own kin: “she looked down and couldn’t
see, for now she was crying, she hadn’t thought she would ever cry for
father, but she hadn’t known, she hadn’t known this thing that was
happening to him!... Father, father, I didn’t know! Oh father, I didn’t
KNOW!” (123). Creedal religion makes its appearance here—“only God
had beaten him in the end”; Chris hears “the Reverend Gibbon’s voice
drone out Dust to dust, ashes to ashes” (123)—but such language is almost
like Chae’s line about suicide: instances of human weakness before the
sublime temple of life itself. It is the latter, the raw vitality of life, that
Sunset Song repeatedly invokes in a virtual liturgy of pagan reverence. This
is not religious writing if we take religion to signify a formal theological
tradition. But the prose poetry of Gibbon’s novel is deeply spiritual, dense
with religious feeling.
And this brings me back to where I started—Crawford Gribben’s
Contrast that with Gibbon’s political critique of the same: “What a curse to the
earth are small nations!” See Gibbon, “Glasgow,” in Scottish Scene, 144.
16
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thoughtful intervention on the subject of religion in Scottish literary
criticism. I am most grateful to Gribben’s article for reminding us to attend
more thoughtfully to this aspect of Scottish literature. Yes, Gribben brings
important attention to an overlooked period of Scottish literary history; and
yes, the literature of that period is often directly attached to formal religion.
We—I—have much to learn here. But more fruitful still may be the
inclusion of less historically specific, but more conceptually capacious,
postsecular perspectives onto Scottish literature. I am not arguing that
postsecular criticism should be the primary way to read the rich Scottish
literary tradition, or that it should displace strong religious criticism like
Gribben’s own. But integrating postsecularity into the breadth of critical
resources already abundantly deployed in our interpretive practices is
likely to help us become better readers of complex, nuanced texts like
Sunset Song—indeed, of dozens, even hundreds of texts from Scotland’s
prismatic past. Further integration of postsecular thought into Scottish
criticism is also likely to attune us more broadly to the range of affects,
literary and critical, that make texts not only mean what they mean but also
make them more meaningful, more dynamic and alive, for us.
Brigham Young University

